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Abstract—In this paper, we address the problem of privacy pro-
tection in video surveillance. We introduce two efficient approaches
to conceal regions of interest (ROIs) based on transform-domain or
codestream-domain scrambling. In the first technique, the sign of
selected transform coefficients is pseudorandomly flipped during
encoding. In the second method, some bits of the codestream are
pseudorandomly inverted. We address more specifically the cases
of MPEG-4 as it is today the prevailing standard in video surveil-
lance equipment. Simulations show that both techniques success-
fully hide private data in ROIs while the scene remains comprehen-
sible. Additionally, the amount of noise introduced by the scram-
bling process can be adjusted. Finally, the impact on coding effi-
ciency performance is small, and the required computational com-
plexity is negligible.
Index Terms—Privacy, selective encryption, surveillance, video
processing.
I. INTRODUCTION
V IDEO surveillance systems are omnipresent nowadays,with large systems in use in strategic places such as public
transportation, airports, city centers, or residential areas. The
prevailing sense of insecurity at the beginning of this century,
with terrorist threats and high criminality, renders the inten-
sive use of video surveillance tolerable despite its Orwellian big
brother nature. However, people have a legitimate fear of this
invasion of their personal privacy, with this objection slowing
down a wider acceptance of video surveillance systems.
In this paper, we address the issue of privacy protection in
video surveillance, with a goal to be able to conciliate the needs
of video surveillance with the objection of privacy invasion.
This issue has been previously addressed in [1]–[10].
In [1], the scene is represented using an object-based repre-
sentation. Depending on the end-user access control authoriza-
tions, the system subsequently renders a modified version of the
video where some objects are masked out. Hence, privacy-sen-
sitive data is not transmitted. In [2], privacy filters, expressed
using a privacy grammar, are introduced. These filters are ap-
plied on incoming video sensor data, preventing access to pri-
vacy-sensitive information.
In [3], it is postulated that face recognition techniques pose
the threat to automatically identify people in a video surveil-
lance scene, hence increasing the invasion of privacy. This issue
is addressed by introducing an algorithm to de-identify faces
such that many facial characteristics are preserved but the face
cannot be reliably recognized.
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In [4], encryption is used to conceal faces. The process is
invertible only for authorized users in possession of the secret
encryption keys, hence preserving the privacy of people under
surveillance. The problem of privacy for JPEG 2000 video [11]
is tackled in [5] and [6]. More specifically, video analysis is ap-
plied to identify regions of interest (ROIs) corresponding for
instance to people or faces. In [5], a wavelet-domain or code-
stream-domain conditional access control technique is proposed
to subsequently scramble code-blocks corresponding to these
ROIs. Alternatively, in [6], these same code-blocks are down-
shifted to the lowest quality layer of the codestream. By re-
stricting the transmission bandwidth, the ROIs are decoded to
a lower quality.
In [7], a region-based transform-domain scrambling tech-
nique is proposed to preserve privacy. ROIs are first estimated
and the corresponding transform ac coefficients are scrambled
by pseudorandomly inverting their signs, concealing any pri-
vacy-sensitive data. The approach is compatible with discrete
wavelet transform (DWT) or discrete cosine transform (DCT),
and the cases of Motion JPEG 2000 [11] and MPEG-4 [12] are
considered.
The technique in [8] removes from the video information cor-
responding to authorized personnel. This privacy information
is then hidden in the video using a compressed-domain water-
marking technique based on a perceptual model and can only be
recovered with a secrete key.
Finally, an MPEG-7 camera is proposed in [9] and [10] which
features an embedded processor to perform video analysis. The
camera outputs an MPEG-7 compliant data stream made of rel-
evant descriptors which allow for video monitoring and surveil-
lance without transmitting actual video data.
In this paper, we propose an extension of our earlier work [7].
We consider the case of MPEG-4 which is currently the most
widespread standard in video surveillance. We first review the
transform-domain scrambling approach initially introduced in
[7]. We also show how it can be extended to scramble dc co-
efficients whenever a stronger scrambling is needed. Then, we
introduce a new codestream-domain scrambling. Indeed, in the
case of IP cameras, the incoming video stream is already com-
pressed and it is advantageous to apply the scrambling process
directly on the codestream in order to save computational com-
plexity. This approach consists in parsing the codestream and
in pseudorandomly inverting some of the bits corresponding to
the ROI ac coefficients. In both the transform-domain and code-
stream domain approaches, the scrambling process depends on
a secret encryption key which can be in possession of law-en-
forcement authorities who are consequently the only ones able
to unlock and view the whole scene in clear. Finally, we perform
a much more extensive and thorough performance study than in
[7], considering not only the privacy protection capability and
coding efficiency, but also a study of the security against both
brute-force and error concealment attacks, and results in a real
video surveillance setting.
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Our proposed scrambling technique provides with a number
of benefits when compared to competing approaches. First, the
same scrambled codestream is transmitted to all terminals inde-
pendently from their access rights. Unauthorized clients, who
do not possess the secret key, can only view a distorted ver-
sion of the content where privacy-sensitive data is concealed.
Conversely, authorized clients, e.g., law-enforcement authori-
ties, can unscramble the codestream and recover the truthful
scene. Moreover, the scrambling process is flexible: the amount
of noise injected can be adapted from slightly fuzzy to very
noisy, and the scrambling can be confined to finely delineated
ROIs. Finally, the impact in terms of coding efficiency is small,
and it demands a low computational complexity.
This paper is structured as follows. We present the proposed
transform-domain scrambling technique in Section II, whereas
the alternative codestream-domain variation is introduced in
Section III. To evaluate performance, experimental results are
presented and discussed in Section IV. Finally, we draw some
conclusions in Section V.
II. TRANSFORM-DOMAIN SCRAMBLING
Here, we describe the proposed transform-domain scram-
bling technique for privacy protection.
Hereafter, we consider more explicitly MPEG-4 [12], as it
is the prevailing standard in current video surveillance equip-
ments. However, the approach is straightforwardly extensible to
all transform-coding techniques based on DCT such as Motion
JPEG or AVC/H.264.
MPEG-4 is based on a motion-compensated (MC)
block-based DCT [12]. More specifically, frames are coded
as intra-frame, predictive-frame, or bidirectional-frame. In all
cases, each frame is divided into 16 16 macroblocks (MBs).
In turn, each MB is composed of four 8 8 luminance blocks
and two 8 8 chrominance blocks. Each of these 8 8 blocks
is DCT transformed, resulting in 64 DCT coefficients: one dc
and 63 ac coefficients.
The scrambling can effectively be applied on the quantized
DCT coefficients and outside of the MC loop, as illustrated
in Fig. 1(a). This approach also guarantees that the scrambled
video stream has a fully standard compliant syntax. Note that,
in the encoder, unscrambled data are used in the MC prediction
loop.
At the decoder side, authorized users perform unscrambling
of the coefficients prior to the MC loop, as depicted in Fig. 1(b),
for a fully reversible scrambling process as the same unscram-
bled data are used in the MC prediction loop as in the encoder.
Conversely, unauthorized users are still able to correctly decode
the video stream, except for the scrambled coefficients. How-
ever, in this case, scrambled data are used in the MC prediction
loop, hence introducing a drift.
One of the challenges is to be able to correctly decode both the
ROI and the background for unauthorized decoders due to the
drift in the MC prediction loop. Note that this issue has typically
not been addressed in previous conditional access control tech-
niques, as it only happens when applying scrambling on given
regions.
The scrambling process is based on a pseudorandom number
generator (PRNG) initialized by a seed value. Multiple seeds
Fig. 1. Transform-domain scrambling in MPEG-4: (a) encoder/scrambler and
(b) decoder/unscrambler.
can be used to strengthen the security. The seed values are
then encrypted, preferably using asymmetric encryption, and
inserted in the codestream, e.g., in private data. In our imple-
mentation, we define one seed value for a group of pictures,
hence resulting in a negligible overhead. Authorized users, in
possession of the secret encryption key, can recover the seed
values and hence reproduce the same pseudorandom sequence
to descramble the coefficients.
In order to unscramble the codestream, authorized decoders
need to know the shape of the ROI. The latter has therefore to
be transmitted as private data in the MPEG-4 codestream. In
this paper, we consider a ROI defined on a MB basis as a good
tradeoff between shape granularity and overhead. Transmitting
the resulting binary mask, without compression, therefore re-
quires 1 b per MB, corresponding to 396 b per frame for CIF
format.
A. AC Coefficients
As previously stated, the scrambling process should not have
a negative impact on coding efficiency. In general, dc coeffi-
cients are strongly correlated. A natural choice is therefore to
apply scrambling to the ac coefficients. Furthermore, whereas
the amplitude of ac coefficients is correlated, their signs are not.
Finally, in MPEG-4, the length of codewords for ac coefficients
remains unchanged if the sign of the coefficient is flipped.
Consequently, we propose to scramble the quantized ac coef-
ficients of the blocks corresponding to the ROI by pseudoran-
domly flipping their sign
if
otherwise. (1)
The amount of scrambling can be adjusted by restricting the
scrambling to fewer ac coefficients. Straightforwardly, as the
scrambling is merely flipping signs of selected coefficients, the
technique requires negligible computational complexity.
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Fig. 2. Video scrambling: (a) normal MB-type decision resulting in drift and
(b) modified MB-type decision removing drift.
B. DC Coefficients
Scrambling all ac coefficients usually provides with a suf-
ficient level of concealment. In case a stronger scrambling is
needed, it is also possible to additionally scramble dc coeffi-
cients.
In the case of Intra MB, the scrambling is done by pseudo-
randomly altering the quantized dc coefficients as shown in (2)
at the bottom of the page, where is the scaling factor
for dc coefficients as defined in MPEG-4, which depends on the
quantizer step size and the MB type. While this may decrease
coding efficiency, the penalty is limited by the fact that relatively
few MBs are intra-coded, and only a subset of those are actually
scrambled. Nevertheless, even though few MBs are intra-coded,
they carry a lot of information in a compressed video stream, and
hence their scrambling has a significant impact on the amount
of distortion introduced in the scrambled sequence.
In the case of inter MB, the scrambling is similar to the one
for ac coefficients, namely the sign is pseudorandomly inverted
as described in Section II-A.
C. MB-Type Decisions
From Fig. 1(b), it can be observed that an unauthorized de-
coder will use a different MC loop when compared with an au-
thorized decoder. Consequently, this may lead to a drift and
results in artifacts in the scrambled sequence, as depicted in
Fig. 2(a). In order to remove this unwanted effect, the MB-type
decision can be modified during encoding. More precisely, un-
scrambled MBs in the current frame, colocated with a scrambled
MB in the reference frame, are always intra coded. This modifi-
cation prevents the drift in MC loop and consequently removes
the artifacts in the scrambled sequence, as shown in Fig. 2(b).
III. CODESTREAM-DOMAIN SCRAMBLING
Nowadays, the trend in video surveillance systems is to utilize
IP cameras. Namely, the incoming stream is already compressed
when outputted by an IP camera. In this scenario, it is therefore
Fig. 3. Codestream-domain scrambling in MPEG-4: (a) transcoder/scrambler
and (b) decoder/unscrambler.
beneficial to apply the scrambling directly in the codestream-
domain as this saves computational complexity. The challenge
of this approach is to produce a scrambled stream which still
conforms to the standard syntax. One has therefore to be careful
when pseudorandomly flipping bits of the codestream.
Hereafter, we introduce a new codestream-domain scram-
bling fulfilling this requirement. It avoids fully decoding and
reencoding the video, but it still requires parsing the codestream
in order to identify which bits correspond to the target syntax
elements. The proposed scheme is illustrated in Fig. 3 for both
the transcoder/scrambler and the decoder. Finally, note that
while this codestream-domain scrambling approach shares
some similarities with the transform-domain scrambling, it is
very different from a system point of view.
A. AC Coefficients
In MPEG-4, DCT coefficients are coded using run-length.
The first codewords of the variable length code (VLC) table
to encode the intra chrominance ac coefficients and Inter lumi-
nance and chrominance coefficients is given in Table I.
It can be observed that the codewords for a given coefficient
value and its opposite are identical except for the last bit “s”
which takes values “0” or “1” for a positive or negative value,
respectively. The VLC table to encode the intra luminance ac
coefficients has a similar structure and exhibits also this prop-
erty. In other words, in the codestream-domain, the sign of an ac
coefficient can be flipped by merely modifying the last bit “s”
of the corresponding codeword.
Hence, ac coefficients scrambling can be effectively per-
formed by pseudorandomly flipping the last bit “s” of the ac
codewords, following the same philosophy and rational as in
Section II-A. It is also possible to control the intensity of the
scrambling by restricting the number of ac coefficients selected
for scrambling.
if
otherwise (2)
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TABLE I
VLC INTER LUMINANCE AND CHROMINANCE DC+AC COEFFICIENTS AND
INTRA CHROMINANCE AC COEFFICIENTS
Finally, note that, by design, this approach does not affect
coding efficiency as the scrambling does not alter the number
of bits in the codestream.
B. DC Coefficients
In MPEG-4, dc coefficients are differentially encoded. More
precisely, each dc coefficient is predicted from the dc of the
block above or the block on the left. The difference between the
prediction and the actual coefficient is computed and this last
value is encoded. For this reason, it is not possible to simply
modify the differential DC value in the codestream as in the ac
case.
As previously stated, it is usually not needed to scramble
dc coefficients, as the scrambling of all ac coefficients result
in a sufficiently strong protection. Nevertheless, if dc coeffi-
cient scrambling is preferred, then the same approach as in
Section II-B can also be used. This requires parsing the code-
stream and to partially decode and reencode the unscrambled
MBs which are using scrambled MB for prediction.
C. MB-Type Decisions
The same drifting phenomenon has discussed in Section II-C
occurs also with the codestream-domain scrambling, and the
same modification of the MB-type decision has to be used to re-
solve it. In the codestream-domain approach, it implies to parse
the codestream and to partially decode and reencode some MBs.
As shown in Section IV-B, this event occurs rarely in typical
video surveillance sequences.
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
Here, we evaluate the performance of the proposed re-
gion-based transform-domain and codestream-domain scram-
bling techniques in terms of privacy protection, coding
Fig. 4. Transform-domain scrambling for Hall Monitor: (a) 63 ac coefficients
and (b) dc + 63 ac coefficients.
efficiency, security, and complexity. Two video test sequences
in CIF format are used: Hall Monitor and Road. Each sequence
has a ground truth segmentation mask defining ROI. Exper-
iments have been performed with the MPEG-4 MoMuSys
Verification Model [13].
A. Privacy Protection
We first consider the capability of the scrambling technique to
hide information in ROI of the video. Figs. 4 and 5 show results
for the transform-domain scrambling.
It can be observed that the scrambling results in a strong dis-
tortion which is clearly sufficient to conceal ROI data so that
people and objects can no longer be identified but the scene re-
mains interpretable. Moreover, the additional scrambling of the
dc coefficients brings an even stronger obscuration.
Results with the codestream-domain scrambling approach are
similarly shown in Figs. 6 and 7. The same observations as for
the transform-domain scrambling can be made.
B. Coding Efficiency
Another important criterion to evaluate the performance
of the proposed scrambling techniques is coding efficiency.
Indeed, it is important that coding performance is not adversely
impacted. For this purpose, we compare the two cases when
no scrambling is applied (i.e., corresponding to the original
MPEG-4 VM codec) and when scrambling and unscrambling
is performed (i.e., for an authorized client). The rate-distor-
tion performances obtained with the transform-domain and
codestream-domain scrambling, for the mode scrambling 63 ac
coefficients, are given in Figs. 8 and 9, respectively.
It can be observed that the proposed scrambling has a neg-
ligible impact on coding efficiency. For Hall Monitor, the rate
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Fig. 5. Transform-domain scrambling for Road: (a) 63 ac coefficients and (b)
dc + 63 ac coefficients.
Fig. 6. Codestream-domain scrambling for Hall Monitor: (a) 63 ac coefficients
and (b) dc + 63 ac coefficients.
increase is between 1%–4%, with most of the penalty due to the
overhead to transmit the segmentation mask. While the coding
efficiency loss is slightly larger for Road, it remains minimal
with a rate increase between 1%–6%. In the latter case, the
worse performance is due to the modification of the MB-type
Fig. 7. Codestream-domain scrambling for Road: (a) 63 ac coefficients and (b)
dc + 63 ac coefficients.
Fig. 8. Rate distortion coding efficiency comparison without and with trans-
form-domain scrambling: (a) Hall Monitor and (b) Road.
decision as described in Section II-C, which is forcing more
MB to be intra coded for this sequence. This is confirmed by
Table II, which shows the average number of MBs per frame
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Fig. 9. Rate distortion coding efficiency comparison without and with code-
stream-domain scrambling: (a) Hall Monitor and (b) Road.
TABLE II
AVERAGE NUMBER OF MBS FORCED TO INTRA IN ORDER TO PREVENT DRIFT
forced to be intra coded in order to prevent drift. This event oc-
curs three times per frame for Road on average, against once per
frame for Hall Monitor. Nevertheless, it remains infrequent.
The transform-domain scrambling itself has a minimal
impact on coding efficiency, as the length of codewords for
ac coefficients remains identical whenever the coefficient sign
is flipped. The codestream-domain scrambling itself does not
modify the coding performance, as it only inverts some bits of
the codestream.
C. Security
1) Brute-Force Attack: We now consider the security of the
proposed scrambling technique against a brute-force attack. We
address more specifically the mode scrambling all 63 ac coeffi-
cients. Note also that this analysis is identical for the transform-
domain and codestream-domain approaches. Assuming that the
attacker knows the ROI, we consider an exhaustive search of all
combinations reversing the signs of all nonzero ac coefficients
in the ROI. Table III reports the statistics for ROI data for the
two test sequences, including the average number of nonzero ac
coefficients in the ROI at 1 Mb/s and 256 kb/s.
TABLE III
STATISTICS OF ROI DATA
(a) (b)
Fig. 10. Error concealment attack: (a) Hall Monitor and (b) Road.
Even for the most vulnerable case, the sequence Road at 256
kb/s, an attacker has already to try reversing the signs of 536 co-
efficients in order to unscramble one frame, representing
combinations. The security is even stronger at 1 Mb/s. Even
though Table III represents a small sampling of typical video
surveillance sequences, it gives a strong argument to confidently
affirm that the proposed scrambling method provides with a
good level of security against a brute-force attack.
2) Error Concealment Attack: Instead of the brute-force at-
tack, an attacker may try an error concealment attack, which
aims at concealing scrambled/encrypted data. Here, we assess
the security of our proposed scrambling method against an at-
tack where ROI ac coefficients are simply set to 0 at the decoder.
In other words, this attack consists of extrapolating the scram-
bled data by motion compensation of the previous frame using
the motion vectors which are available to the attacker. Note that
we assume also that the ROI is known.
Fig. 10 shows the results of such an attack on the transform-
domain scrambling when 63 ac coefficients are scrambled. We
observe that this attack is inefficient. Furthermore, more sophis-
ticated error concealment is unlikely to produce better results,
as by definition the scrambled foreground objects have different
characteristics when compared to the background and therefore
cannot be extrapolated from the latter.
D. Scrambling in a Real Video Surveillance Setting
While in the previous sections we have shown results using
some well-known video test sequences and associated ground-
truth segmentation masks, we now substantiate the effectiveness
of the proposed scrambling approach in a real video surveillance
environment setting.
For this purpose, we show results on a video sequence cap-
tured in real surveillance situations with an analog camera. The
video is then processed using a hardware device featuring a
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(a) (b)
Fig. 11. Privacy protection scrambling in a real video surveillance setting: (a)
original sequence and (b) with transform-domain scrambling.
real-time DSP implementation of background/foreground seg-
mentation, MPEG-4 encoding and scrambling. The scrambling
is using the transform-domain approach where 63 ac coefficients
are pseudorandomly scrambled. Results are shown in Fig. 11. It
can be observed that both pedestrians and moving cars are suc-
cessfully scrambled.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have described a technique to address the
issue of privacy in video surveillance. Regions of interest, as-
sumed to correspond to privacy-sensitive data, are scrambled.
In one approach, scrambling is applied in the transform-do-
main by pseudorandomly flipping the sign of transform ac co-
efficients or by pseudorandomly modifying dc coefficients. In a
second approach, scrambling is performed directly on the com-
pressed codestream by pseudorandomly inversing some bits cor-
responding to ac coefficients.
Simulation results show that the proposed scrambling tech-
niques are successful at concealing privacy-sensitive informa-
tion while leaving the scene comprehensible. The protection de-
pends on a secret encryption key and the process is fully re-
versible for authorized users, e.g., law-enforcement authorities,
in possession of the latter. After scrambling, the resulting code-
stream is still standard compliant. Simulations results show that
this is obtained with a negligible impact on coding efficiency
and a small computational complexity. Moreover, the scram-
bling process is flexible and the amount of distortion introduced
can be adjusted from mere fuzzy to very noisy. Finally, the
method is shown to be secured against brute-force or error con-
cealment attacks.
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